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SPEAKING OF LEGACY: TOWARD AN ETHOS OF MODESTY AT
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
By Sara Kendall and Sarah M. H. Nouwen*
Pour qu’un he´ritage soit re´ellement grand, il faut que la main du de´funt ne se voie pas.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2014, a year of memorial ceremonies commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the
Rwandan genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) marked its own
twentieth year with the launch of a “legacy website.”2 With the closing of the Tribunal sched-
uled for December 2015,3 the question of its legacy had become increasingly pressing. The
website premiered a video that “celebrates the accomplishments of the ICTR” in a “visually
compelling” style.4 Blurring the distinction between documentary account and film trailer, the
video begins with iconic images of the African continent: a boy rolling a hoop down a dirt road;
laborers ferrying wares; women in colorful dresses tending children. These scenes of daily life
are interrupted by images of men wielding machetes and corpses, interspersed with the figure
of the radio, reminding the viewer that the 1994 genocide was encouraged through broadcasts
inciting Hutus to take up arms against their Tutsi neighbors. The video lists the Tribunal’s
contributions to international criminal law, but also describes a much broader impact: “a
record of legal reform in Rwanda, and outreach, education, legal training, and healing.” Young
boys leap into a body of water to punctuate the final term, suggesting the hope of a new
Rwanda. The narrator proclaims, “today in Rwanda, it’s safe to listen to the radio again: the
sound is of a nation rebuilding.” The film’s final words reach beyond the Rwandan context,
affirming that ours is “a world pushing forward despite great imperfection, each day closer to
a time when international law offers justice to all people, everywhere.”
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the input of Erica Bussey (commenting in a personal capacity), Devon Cur-
tis, and Aime´ Muyoboke Karimunda, and the research assistance of Michael A. Becker. Nouwen’s work was sup-
ported by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant nr ES/L010976/1), the Leverhulme Trust (PLP-2014-
067), and the Isaac Newton Trust (RG79578); she worked on this article while a visiting senior fellow at the World
Peace Foundation. This article was finalized in December 2015, in the weeks before the ICTR officially closed.
1 RENE´ CHAR, FEUILLETS D’HYPNOS 166 (Cid Corman, trans. 1973) (1948) (“For an inheritance to be really
great, the hand of the defunct must not be seen.”).
2 Press Release, ICTR, 20 Years Challenging Impunity—UN-ICTR Launches Legacy Website and New Tribute
Video (Nov. 6, 2014), at http://www.unmict.unictr.org/en/news/20-years-challenging-impunity-%E2%80%93-
un-ictr-launches-legacy-website-and-new-tribute-video. The video is available at http://unictr.unmict.org/ [here-
inafter ICTR Legacy Video].
3 Letter Dated 15 May 2015 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Addressed
to the President of the Security Council, Report on the Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda as of 5 May 2015, UN Doc. S/2015/340, paras. 1, 5 (May 15, 2015).
4 ICTR, ICTR Legacy Project Proposals, at http://www.unmict.org/ictr-remembers/docs/legacy_projects.pdf.
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The ICTR’s legacy video highlights the Tribunal’s own role in Rwanda. It foregrounds
ICTR trials without noting the thousands of domestic criminal trials that took place under
Rwanda’s 1996 law governing the prosecution of genocide-related crimes5 or the prosecution
of around 400,000 individuals through community-based gacaca courts.6 Furthering interna-
tional criminal law’s logics and presumptions, including the view that trials promote peace and
security, the video also claims that the ICTR has also led to “healing” without mentioning the
work of other actors, such as civil society organizations and the Rwandan state.7 Meanwhile,
accounts of decreasing political freedom in Rwanda are conspicuously absent.8 Narrated in the
dominant language of international criminal law, with the option of Kinyarwanda subtitles for
those who can read them, the video appears oriented toward a global Anglophone audience.
The ICTR sees its legacy extending well beyond Rwanda, in that the form of justice it repre-
sents will “become a standard for all, everywhere.”9
This article questions some of the claims made within the field of international criminal law
about the Tribunal’s legacy. “Legacy” is not the same as “impact,” which occurs continuously
in the life of an institution. By contrast, the Tribunal’s legacy can only properly begin in the
wake of its closure. While the legacy of the ICTR continues to evolve, there are some claims
about what it may become that can be addressed from the standpoint of the present.10 We con-
tend that many of the claims about the ICTR’s legacy are, however, a form of a phenomenon
that we term “legacy talk.” Whereas legacy planning involves ensuring that there will be some-
thing to leave behind, legacy talk seeks to consolidate a set of interpretations about the sub-
stance and value of what is left.
We begin by analyzing the concept of “legacy” in the context of international criminal tri-
bunals (Part II), and by contrasting the ICTR’s official mandate with dominant claims about
the Tribunal’s envisioned legacy (Part III). Against this background, we then discuss a range
of legacies that the ICTR may potentially leave, some of which are more uncertain than others
(Part IV). In light of the divergence between what is claimed and what can be supported, we
5 Recognizing the role of these trials in promoting accountability is not necessarily the same as praising them;
much commentary has noted serious issues with the enforcement of fair trial rights and the application of the death
penalty. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda’s Domestic Geno-
cide Trials, 29 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545 (1998).
6 Their contribution to reconciliation is a matter of scholarly debate. Compare Philip Clark, After Genocide:
Democracy in Rwanda, 20 Years On, 20 JUNCTURE 308, 310 (2014) with Bert Ingelaere, “Does the Truth Pass Across
the Fire Without Burning?” Locating the Short Circuit in Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, 47 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 507 (2009)
and Patrick Kanyangara, Bernard Rime´, Dario Paez & Vincent Yzerbyt, Trust, Individual Guilt, Collective Guilt and
Dispositions Toward Reconciliation Among Rwandan Survivors and Prisoners Before and After Their Participation in
Postgenocide Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 2 J. SOC. & POL. PSYCHOL. 401 (2014).
7 On which, see, for example, Timothy Longman, Phuong Pham & Harvey M. Weinstein, Connecting Justice
to Human Experience: Attitudes Toward Accountability and Reconciliation in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENE-
MY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 206 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Wein-
stein eds., 2004); Timothy Longman & The´one`ste Rutagengwa, Memory, Identity, and Community in Rwanda, in
MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY 162.
8 On which, see, for example, Filip Reyntjens, Chronique Politique du Rwanda, 2014–2015, in L’AFRIQUE DES
GRANDS LACS: ANNUAIRE 2014–2015 251 (Filip Reyntjens, Stef Vandeginste & S. Marysse eds., 2015).
9 ICTR Press Release, supra note 2.
10 Not having conducted research in Rwanda, we do not contribute new empirical data. Rather, our aim is to
reflect upon published knowledge on the legacy of the ICTR in Rwanda. The views of conflict-affected populations
tend to feature at the margins of these narratives. This account cannot remedy that marginalization, which would
require shifting from institutional points of departure and beginning from the views and circumstances of the Rwan-
dan population rather than from the ICTR.
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conclude with a call for an ethos of modesty, at the ICTR and within international criminal
law more broadly (Part V).
II. LEGACY AS A “BID FOR IMMORTALITY”
Preparations for the closure of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda have led to what Viviane Dittrich has characterized as a “legacy
turn”withinthefieldof internationalcriminal law.11 However,despite theemergenceofadiscourse
regarding the legacy of international criminal tribunals, the term is rarely defined, or it is conveyed
throughotherundefinedconcepts suchas“theruleof law.”Forexample, theUNOfficeof theHigh
Commissioner for Human Rights defines “legacy” as the “lasting impact on bolstering the rule of
law in a particular society,” which is achieved “by conducting effective trials to contribute to ending
impunity, while also strengthening domestic judicial capacity.”12 This definition fails to recognize
the spectrum of possible ways in which a tribunal can leave a legacy, limiting the potential conduits
to effective trials and strengthening domestic judicial capacity. What if a tribunal has promoted the
“rule of law” in some respects, but has undermined it in others?
The vagueness of the term notwithstanding, many tribunals have engaged in talking about their
legacies. In doing so, they illustrate social theorist Zygmunt Bauman’s argument that the fact of
mortality and the desire for immortality are visible not only at the level of the individual human
psyche, but also within institutions.13 As institutional legators, international criminal tribunals
make “bids for immortality,” in Bauman’s words, by engaging in efforts to “colonize” the future
through recounting their life narratives,14 rendering their “lives” part of something larger than the self.
Thegrammarused in legacyconferences, reports,websites, andvideos that set forthclaimsabout
the legacy of these tribunals reveals that legacy talk desires to influence interpretation and uptake
through the grammatical closure of the future perfect tense: it states what the legator will have been
once its activity has been completed, which requires transforming an imagined future into a seem-
ingly descriptive claim from the standpoint of the present. It harbors an epistemological conceit by
projecting an impossible knowledge of what is still to come. The future perfect will have been of leg-
acy talk is accompanied by a grammatically imperfect unfolding of a legator’s value in the present.
Legacytalkthus inhabits twogrammatical senses:boththeperfect (complete) future-orientedsense,
as well as the imperfect (incomplete) ongoing action.15 In this way, legacy talk contains a tension
betweenitsdesiredclosure throughthefutureperfectandthe indeterminacyof legacy itself.Atevery
moment of its imperfect unfolding, the vision of the completed legacy is threatened by alternate
possibilities despite the efforts of the legator to direct or plan its legacy.16
11 Viviane E. Dittrich, Legacies in the Making: Assessing the Institutionalized Legacy Endeavor of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 663 (Charles C. Jalloh ed., 2013).
12 OFFICE OF THE UN HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE OF LAW TOOLS FOR POSTCONFLICT
STATES, MAXIMIZING THE LEGACY OF HYBRID COURTS, at 4–5, UN Sales No. HR/PUB/08/2 (2008).
13 ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MORTALITY, IMMORTALITY AND OTHER LIFE STRATEGIES 2 (1992).
14 Id.
15 Legal rhetorician Marianne Constable notes the “peculiar temporality” of speech acts such as legal decisions
that will turn out to have had particular effects, such as the phenomenon of establishing legal precedent through
judgments. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, OUR WORD IS OUR BOND: HOW LEGAL SPEECH ACTS 73 (2014).
16 In her work on what she terms “revisionary practices,” such as truth commissions and international criminal
trials, philosopher Jill Stauffer illustrates how the meaning of the past in the present changes over time. See JILL
STAUFFER, ETHICAL LONELINESS: THE INJUSTICE OF NOT BEING HEARD 112 (2015).
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Although “colonization of the future is bound to remain forever disconcertingly provisional
and nondefinite—the future is, after all, the site of the selfsame uncertainty which has
prompted the colonizing thrust in the first place”17—these practices increase as tribunal man-
dates draw to a close and the need to shape their legacies becomes more urgent. In the case of
the ICTR, this began in 2003 when the Tribunal developed its first “completion strategy” in
response to pressure from the Security Council.18 With the establishment in 2010 of an “Inter-
national Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals” tasked with carrying out “residual func-
tions” of the ICTY and ICTR after trials ended,19 and with the final deadline becoming more
tangible, attention to the ICTR’s legacy increased not only among policymakers and scholars,
but also within the Tribunal itself.20
III. ENVISIONING THE ICTR’S LEGACY: FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE
TRIBUNAL
The legacy of the ICTR can be approached in light of the institutional ambitions expressed
by its constitutive power, the UN Security Council. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, and thus invoking the imperatives of international peace and security,21 the Security
Council established the ICTR in November 1994 in response to the Rwandan genocide that
had taken place between April 7 and mid-July of the same year.22 While stressing “the partic-
ular circumstances of Rwanda,” the Council in fact reaffirmed the powers it had used when
creating the ICTY a year earlier by establishing another international criminal tribunal as a
means to promote international peace and security.
Security Council Resolution 955 focused on the Tribunal’s expected contribution to
Rwanda. The preamble sets forth the Council’s theory of change, declaring that it was:
[c]onvinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law would enable th[e]
aim [of putting an end to genocide and . . . systematic, widespread and flagrant violations
of international humanitarian law] to be achieved and would contribute to the process of
national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.23
Council Members may have had other reasons for establishing the Tribunal (for instance, to
assuage the guilt of inaction during the genocide) and may have had doubts about the goals that
17 BAUMAN, supra note 13, at 54.
18 U.N.Secretary-General,Budget for theInternationalCriminalTribunal for theProsecutionofPersonsResponsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring
States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994 for the Biennium 2004–2005, Annex, UN Doc. A/58/269 (Aug. 12,
2003).
19 S.C. Res. 1966 (Dec. 22, 2010).
20 See also Nigel Eltringham, A Legacy Deferred? The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at 20 Years (Apr.
29, 2014), available at http://www.e-ir.info/2014/04/29/a-legacy-deferred-the-international-criminal-tribunal-
for-rwanda-at-20-years/.
21 U.N. Charter Art. 39.
22 S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
23 Id. at pmbl.
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the Tribunal was meant to serve,24 but the resolution suggests that prosecution aids the dis-
parate projects of ending international crimes and promoting national reconciliation as well
as the restoration and maintenance of peace. The Council also highlighted “the need for inter-
national cooperation to strengthen the Courts and Judicial System of Rwanda,” but it did not
support this by any decision in the operative part of its resolution.
The focus of the ICTR’s own legacy claims diverge remarkably from that of Resolution 955.
For instance, an ICTR publication entitled Learning from the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda: The Legacy largely consists of a description of the Tribunal, biographies and pic-
tures of judges and other senior officials, an enumeration of cases, trial days and visitors to the
information center, and instances in which the ICTR was the “first” to do something in inter-
national criminal law.25 National reconciliation and peace in Rwanda appear mainly in ref-
erences to Resolution 955, not in the work of the Tribunal.
In its formal statements, reports, and legacy video, the ICTR portrayed its legacy as com-
prising, first, the investigations, prosecutions, and trials it has undertaken; second, its contri-
bution to the field of international criminal law; and third, and subsidiarily, its contribution
to Rwanda.26 For the first category, the numbers are the narrative, rendering legacy more con-
crete through the sheer quantity of things seen and heard at trial and through the numbers of
people circulating through the Arusha courtrooms: 20,000 evidence exhibits; 27,000 hours of
testimony; ninety-three indictees; seventy-five trials; sixty-one convictions,27 involving “one
Prime Minister, four Ministers, one Prefect, five Bourgmestres and several others holding lead-
ership positions during the events in 1994.”28 Related to these enumerated achievements are
the material bequests that the ICTR leaves behind, in the form of archives transferred from the
Tribunal to the Arusha branch of the Residual Mechanism. The future of the archives is directly
linked to a more metaphysical part of the Tribunal’s legacy: according to an ICTR President,
“[a]mong the most basic and most important of the Tribunal’s achievements has been the accu-
mulation of an indisputable historical record.”29
Most prominent is the claim of having made substantial contributions to international criminal
law,boththroughcase lawonsubstantiveandprocedural issues, andthroughbeingthefirst tribunal
since Nuremberg and Tokyo to indict, arrest, and convict certain categories of people.30 Moreover
as “part of a broader strategy [that] the [ICTR Office of the Prosecutor] has undertaken to preserve
24 For diverging expectations among Security Council members, see U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., UN
Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994).
25 ICTR PRESS & PUBLIC AFFAIRS UNIT, LEARNING FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA: THE LEGACY (2009).
26 ICTR officials themselves have widely diverging views on the Tribunal’s mandate. See Nigel Eltringham,
“When We Walk Out, What Was It All About?”: Views on New Beginnings from Within the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, 45 DEV. & CHANGE 543 (2014) and NICOLA PALMER, COURTS IN CONFLICT: INTER-
PRETING THE LAYERS OF JUSTICE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA (2015).
27 ICTR Legacy Video, supra note 2.
28 LEARNING FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, supra note 25 at 39.
29 Judge Dennis Byron’s Address to the UN General Assembly, ICTR NEWSLETTER, Oct. 2008, at 1, at http://
www.unmict.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/news/newsletters/oct08.pdf. Based on research conducted within the
ICTR, however, Palmer asserts that Tribunal officials are divided over whether creating a historical record is part
of the ICTR’s mandate and on whether the Tribunal has accomplished this. See PALMER, supra note 26, at 64–67.
30 See ICTR, ICTR Milestones, at http://www.unmict.unictr.org/en/ictr-milestones; ICTR Legacy Video, supra
note 2; LEARNING FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, supra note 25; Dennis
C. M. Byron, Looking at Legacy and Looking Back on the Legacy Symposium, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
319 (2008); Erik Møse, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 920 (2005).
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the ICTR’s legacy for future use,”31 the Tribunal has developed “best practices” manuals for other
courts on subjects such as prosecuting sexual violence crimes and referring cases to national juris-
dictions. It has also developed a directory of ex-ICTR staff to serve in future positions relating to
the prosecution of international crimes. These contributions are presented as strengthening the
field’s ability to live on into the future after the closure of the ICTR.
Finally, and subsidiarily, the ICTR claims that it has contributed to developments in
Rwanda. An ICTR press release notes that by referring cases to the Rwandan criminal courts,
“the ICTR contributed to a host of legal reforms and infrastructure improvements at the
national level that were necessary to secure the fair trial rights of the accused.”32 The Tribunal’s
legacy video reiterates the Tribunal’s contributions to outreach, education, and legal training,
along with the more abstract claims of “healing” and its role in rebuilding the Rwandan
nation.33
IV. A RANGE OF POTENTIAL LEGACIES
The conviction with which the Tribunal makes its claims contrasts sharply with the
ambiguity of what can be known about its legacy. This is inherent in the concept of legacy;
legacies are assessed over time, and by various parties other than the legator. But even if
we were to assess the Tribunal’s prospective legacy by examining its impact to date and
from the Tribunal’s perspective, we would face the problem of causal inference. Exper-
imental design is not possible when assessing the impact of an international criminal tri-
bunal. There is no randomized control group, and no tribunal or state would serve as an
ideal counterfactual: tribunals and the political contexts in which they operate are so
diverse that factors unrelated to the involvement of the international tribunal could
explain different outcomes. There are a number of confounding factors, such as third vari-
ables generating an empirical association between two variables (such as between the ICTR
and developments in Rwanda) that are actually independent, and intervening variables.
While it could be possible to identify intervening causal processes through the method of
process tracing in the case of a relatively direct impact (for instance, of the ICTR upon the
development of international criminal law), it is much more difficult to do so when assess-
ing its impact on complex issues such as peace and reconciliation.
As opposed to demonstrable findings, many of the claims made about the ICTR’s impact
are either hypotheses, setting forth how the Tribunal could have an impact,34 or assertions of
hopes or normative opinions as to what its impact should be. There is a wealth of what might
be termed “impact speculation,” but relatively little empirical evidence to support it.35 The Tri-
bunal’s contribution to Rwanda is mostly assessed from an aspirational standpoint, which
31 Press Release, ICTR, ICTR Prosecutor Releases Best Practices Manual on Referral of International Criminal
Cases to National Jurisdictions (Feb. 11, 2015), at http://www.unmict.unictr.org/en/news/ictr-prosecutor-releases-
best-practices-manual-referral-international-criminal-cases-national.
32 Id.
33 ICTR Legacy Video, supra note 2.
34 See, e.g., Francois-Xavier Nsanzuwera, The ICTR Contribution to National Reconciliation, 3 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 944 (2005) (setting forth theories as to how the ICTR may contribute to reconciliation).
35 See also David S. Koller, The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1019
(2008); Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Justifying Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
327 ( James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012); Carsten Stahn, Between “Faith” and “Facts”: By What
Standards Should We Assess International Criminal Justice?, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 251 (2012).
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draws upon what the Tribunal’s founding documents claim or the repeated assertions by staff
and proponents that congeal over time into standard narratives.
The research climate in Rwanda provides other epistemological challenges. There is no
shortage of scholarship on Rwanda in general or on issues of transitional justice in par-
ticular. Relatively safe and accessible, post-genocide Rwanda has served as a laboratory for
postconflict research. Yet scholars have noted the difficulty of carrying out work in a cli-
mate of fear for personal consequences, both for the researcher and for individuals par-
ticipating in their research.36 In response to the genocide, the ruling Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) has taken drastic measures to eliminate “genocide ideology” and to reeducate
the population in what it means to be Rwandan. It attempts to set the dominant historical
narrative, to determine what kinds of questions are worthy of being posed, and to shape
answers to research questions.37 Researchers have recounted how their permits were
revoked on the ground that their research “was not the kind of research the government
needed,”38 others have been declared personae non gratae.39
Finally, even if we were able to establish the Tribunal’s impact, its reception would need
to be understood in relation to the political context of contemporary Rwanda. A key fea-
ture of that context is that the government of the past twenty years has been dominated
by the movement that not only ended the genocide, but that also won a war through a mil-
itary victory. The political climate that follows from military victory generates ideas, per-
ceptions, and resistance that are different from those following a negotiated settlement.
All in all, Rwandans will receive any legacy in a context that may shape its meaning in a
radically different way from the way that an international tribunal understands its own
legacy.
While acknowledging these challenges, we can identify aspects of the potential legacy of the
ICTR, beginning from those elements that are relatively clear and ending with those that
remain relatively uncertain.
Contributions to the Development and Mainstreaming of International Criminal Law
Perhaps the least contested element of the ICTR’s legacy is the fact that its case law has
made significant contributions to doctrinal international criminal law and has demon-
strated that individuals in certain positions can be held to account for grave crimes.40 The
36 See Bert Ingelaere, Do We Understand Life after Genocide? Center and Periphery in the Construction of Knowledge
in Post-genocide Rwanda, 53 AFR. STUD. REV. 41 (2010); Longman & Rutagengwa, supra note 7, at 164.
37 See Ingelaere, supra note 6, at 522; Ingelaere, supra note 36, at 52–54; JOHAN POTTIER, REIMAGINING
RWANDA: CONFLICT, SURVIVAL AND DISINFORMATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002); FILIP
REYNTJENS, POLITICAL GOVERNANCE IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 228–29 (2013).
38 Susan Thomson, Getting Close to Rwandans Since the Genocide: Studying Everyday Life in Highly Politicized
Research Settings, 53 AFR. STUD. REV. 19, 22–23 (2010). See also Susan Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation:
Participant Observations on Ingando, in REMAKING RWANDA: STATE BUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER
MASS VIOLENCE 331 (Scott Straus & Lars Waldorf eds., 2011).
39 REYNTJENS, supra note 37, at xv, 125–26.
40 See, e.g., LARISSA VAN DEN HERIK, THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE RWANDA TRIBUNAL TO THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); Hassan Bubacar Jallow, The Contribution of the United Nations Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the Development of International Criminal Law, in AFTER GENOCIDE:
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, POSTCONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION, AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND
BEYOND 261 (Philip Clark & Zachary D. Kaufman eds., 2008).
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ICTR legacy website claims that the Tribunal is responsible for many inaugural moments
in the field: it was “the first” international tribunal to enter a judgment for genocide; to
interpret the definition of genocide set out in the 1948 Genocide Convention; to define
rape in international criminal law and to recognize it as a means of perpetrating genocide;
and, since Nuremberg, to issue a judgment against a former head of state, among other
things.41 An extensive body of literature has noted the importance of these and other
“firsts” of the ICTR for the development of substantive and procedural international crim-
inal law, including its influence on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and decisions concerning international crimes in national, internationalized, and
other international courts.42
The Tribunal has also promoted international criminal law as a professional field. As
anthropologist Nigel Eltringham has argued, “there can be no doubt that a significant leg-
acy of the ICTR is . . . the creation of a cadre of lawyers and judges who are equipped to
populate international courtrooms in the future.”43 In developing international criminal
law as a profession and delivering a body of advocates ready to serve in international crim-
inal tribunals, the ICTR, like the ICTY, has also disseminated international criminal tri-
bunal-specific practices, contributing to the spread of this legal form. Mikkel Jarle Chris-
tensen has demonstrated how these professionals are involved in efforts to expand the role
and influence of international criminal justice to ensure the ongoing relevance of their
experience.44
Finally, the ICTR, like the ICTY, has helped make individual criminal accountability a
response to mass atrocity.45 By linking criminal justice to the pursuit of peace in two locations,
the Security Council emboldened a movement that sought the creation of a permanent inter-
national criminal court that could, in theory, exercise jurisdiction globally. The institution-
alization of international criminal law has resulted in this particular conception of justice
becoming more preeminent than alternative conceptions, such as restorative and distributive
justice. The ICTR has thus contributed to the idea of international criminal law being the path
towards “justice to all people, everywhere.”46 According to some commentators, the develop-
ment and preservation of that legacy requires that the application of international criminal law
becomes a standard and universal response to mass atrocity.47
41 See ICTR Milestones, supra note 30.
42 See sources cited at note 40, supra. See also, Payam Akhavan, The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence,
3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 989 (2005); Kelly D. Askin, Gender Crimes Jurisprudence in the ICTR: Positive Developments,
3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1007 (2005); and articles by John Cerone, Suzanne Chenault, and Catherine A. MacK-
innon, in 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 211 (2008).
43 Eltringham, supra note 20.
44 See Mikkel Jarle Christensen, From Symbolic Surge to Closing Courts: The Transformation of International Crim-
inal Justice and its Professional Practices, 43 INT’L J. LAW, CRIME & JUST. 609 (2015).
45 See also Morten Bergsmo & Philippa Webb, Some Lessons for the International Criminal Court from the Inter-
national Judicial Response to the Rwandan Genocide, in AFTER GENOCIDE, supra note 40, at 351.
46 ICTR Legacy Video, supra note 2.
47 Leila N. Sadat, The Contribution of the ICTR to the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN AFRICA: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROS-
ECUTOR HASSAN BUBACAR JALLOW 118, 129 (Charles C. Jalloh & Alhagi B. M. Marong eds., 2015) (also refer-
ring to a speech by Judge Meron to that effect).
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Justice “Done,” “Not Done,” and Pending
By rendering judgment against seventy defendants, the ICTR has “done” a considerable
amount of retributive justice.48 The Tribunal promoted individual criminal responsibility for
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in Rwanda and beyond, by holding people
to account who might have otherwise escaped accountability.49 From the perspective of pro-
moting the rule of law, the fact that it has prosecuted senior members of the former govern-
ment, including a prime minister, is particularly significant, as it demonstrates that even those
once in the highest positions of power can be held legally accountable for their actions.
Nonetheless, the pro-accountability and anti-impunity message has been weakened by the
fact that the ICTR has opened no cases against people with ties to the incumbent government
for crimes allegedly committed by the RPF/Army during the 1994 conflict. According to the
late Alison Des Forges, at least 25,000 to 30,000 people, including civilians, may have been
killed by the RPF.50 Des Forges argued that these killings were widespread and systematic
rather than “unconnected crimes” carried out by individual soldiers, and that RPF command-
ers must have known about and at least tolerated these abuses. Carla Del Ponte, former pros-
ecutor for the ICTR, investigated RPF members suspected of being involved in the June 1994
massacre of the archbishop of Kigali and others, yet the government of Rwanda refused to
cooperate, and as a result there was insufficient evidence to bring indictments.51 While calling
on states to assist investigations of the RPF, the Security Council then limited Del Ponte’s
responsibilities to the ICTY, creating a new post for a prosecutor of the ICTR.52 The official
rationale was efficiency and equal prosecutorial attention for the ICTR as for the ICTY. How-
ever, many commentators (as well as Del Ponte herself) claim that the Rwandan government’s
successful diplomatic campaign opposing her efforts to bring charges against some RPF sol-
diers was a central reason for this change. The new prosecutor, Hassan Jallow, reported to the
Security Council that he had reached an “understanding” with the Rwandan government to
leave the prosecution of Rwandan army officers suspected of having been involved in the June
1994 massacre to the Rwandan Prosecutor General.53 Victor Peskin refers to this as “Jallow’s
‘compromise,’”54 in that it seemed to result in some degree of accountability, yet it also allowed
the Rwandan government to avoid a high-profile international criminal prosecution of RPF
suspects while acquitting two commanding officers and convicting two junior RPF officers and
48 As of Mid-November 2015, the ICTR reported that it had indicted ninety-three individuals and concluded
proceedings for seventy-eight accused (including four individuals whose cases were transferred to other jurisdic-
tions, two instances in which the indictment was withdrawn, and two instances in which the accused died before
judgment), with six individuals’ cases remaining on appeal. The Tribunal also transferred the cases of nine fugitives
to other jurisdictions. ICTR, ICTR Key Figures, at http://www.unmict.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/publications/
ictr-key-figures-en.pdf.
49 See, e.g., Møse, supra note 30, at 933. See also ICTR/Legacy – Rwanda Tribunal Has Blazed a Trail Despite Its
Weaknesses, Says Expert, HIRONDELLE NEWS, Dec. 31, 2013, at http://www.hirondellenews.com/ictr-rwanda/
404-ictr-institutional-news/34529-311213-ictrlegacy-rwanda-tribunal-has-blazed-a-trail-despite-its-weaknesses-says-expert.
50 ALISON DES FORGES, “LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY”: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA, 16, 734 (1999).
51 Carla Del Ponte with Chuck Sudetic, MADAME PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY’S
WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY, A MEMOIR 229 (2009).
52 S.C. Res. 1503, paras. 8–9 (Aug. 28, 2003).
53 Statement by Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor of the ICTR, to the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.5904,
at 11 ( Jun. 4, 2008).
54 Victor Peskin, Victor’s Justice Revisited: Rwandan Patriotic Front Crimes and the Prosecutorial Endgame at the
ICTR, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 38, at 180.
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giving them relatively light sentences.55 The ICTR has not brought any charges against mem-
bers of the RPF, and the Residual Mechanism does not have jurisdiction to do so.
The reasons why the ICTR did not move against the RPF have been convincingly
described.56 Key among these is the Tribunal’s extensive dependence upon the Rwandan gov-
ernment for cooperation, ranging from granting permission for its investigators to enter
Rwanda to not blocking Rwandans from testifying before the ICTR.57 Rather than fearing
international condemnation or even sanctions for noncooperation, the Rwandan government
has managed to maintain financial and political support by leveraging the West’s guilt for its
failures during the genocide.58
These explanations, whether accepted or not, do not change the fact—noted by many schol-
ars—that RPF impunity also forms part of the Tribunal’s legacy.59 Whereas the ICTR has con-
tributed to building “the rule of law” in Rwanda by holding some individuals to account, it has
not demonstrated that even those still in power are subject to law—perhaps the most important
element of this concept. To the contrary, the ICTR’s actions can be seen as legitimating RPF
impunity at the international level.60
Apart from the groups of people for whom justice was “done” and “not done,” there are at
least two groups of people for whom justice is pending. Eight individuals indicted by the ICTR
remain at large.61 Justice is also pending for the eleven individuals who have been acquitted by
the ICTR or who have served their sentences but have not been relocated by the Tribunal.62
Here justice is pending in that the process of retributive justice is only partially implemented;
the crucial part—that those acquitted or who have served their sentences can live freely—re-
mains unfulfilled. The Tribunal has arrangements with third states to accept witnesses for
resettlement and the convicted for incarceration, but few states have proved willing to accom-
modate former ICTR defendants who have been acquitted or have served their sentences.
These individuals have often not felt safe to return to Rwanda because of an environment where
ICTR acquittals are met with public demonstrations63 and are treated as forms of “genocide
55 See Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes
and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 49 (2011). On whether Del Ponte had previously backed
out of such a “deal” with the Rwandan government, see KINGSLEY C. MOGHALU, RWANDA’S GENOCIDE: THE
POLITICS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 145 (2005). For the denial of the existence of a deal, see DEL PONTE, supra note
51, at 231–34.
56 See, e.g., MOGHALU, supra note 55, at 173; ICTR/Legacy, supra note 49.
57 Peskin, supra note 54, at 176.
58 See Eugenia Zorbas, Aid Dependence and Policy Independence: Explaining the Rwandan Paradox, in REMAKING
RWANDA, supra note 38, at 104.
59 See the open letter Ensuring ICTR Prosecutions for RPF War Crimes to the UN Secretary-General, President
Barack Obama, and Prime Minister Gordon Brown, dated June 1, 2009, signed by fifty Rwanda scholars, available
at http://uk-africa.blogspot.com/2009/06/ensuring-ictr-prosecutions-for-rpf-war.html.
60 For a more optimistic reading, see the comments of Professor Guichaoua in ICTR/Legacy, supra note 49.
61 Responsibility for three of them has been handed over to the Residual Mechanism; Rwanda would try the other
five. United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, Searching for the Fugitives, at http://www.
unmict.org/en/cases/searching-fugitives.
62 Caroline Buisman & Kate Gibson, Acquitted by Law, Prosecuted by Propaganda, JUST. IN CONFLICT (Mar.
31, 2014), at http://justiceinconflict.org/2014/03/31/acquitted-by-law-prosecuted-by-propaganda/.
63 See Filip Reyntjens, Chronique Politique du Rwanda, 2012–2013, in L’AFRIQUE DES GRANDS LACS: ANNU-
AIRE 2012–2013 287, 300 (Filip Reyntjens, Stef Vandeginste & M. Verpoorten eds., 2013).
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denial.”64 Some of them have remained in a UN safe house in Arusha for over a decade,65 living
the life of “virtual prisoner[s].”66 The production of this liminal status—one in which people
remain caught within the Tribunal’s symbolic and literal space, unable to return to their prior
lives—may also become part of the ICTR’s legacy.
Thus far we have considered the extent to which the ICTR has been able to carry out retrib-
utive justice. Other forms of justice were not done by the ICTR because it was not given the
mandate to pursue them. For instance, the United Nations did not provide the Tribunal with
any mandate or funds for reparations to victims, not even for those who testified in ICTR pro-
ceedings.67 Appeals from international NGOs and ICTR officials to the United Nations for
more attention to victims have not received practical follow-up.68 However, this absence in
mandate and budget at the ICTR, as well as at the ICTY, did arguably foster proposals for pro-
ceedings for victims and a Victims Trust Fund as part of the Rome Statute for the ICC.69 What
are now considered omissions from the ICTR mandate may have informed a “best practices”
legacy after all.70
A Historical Record
It is virtually uncontested that the ICTR has left a historical record; it has kilometers and
petabytes of material on Rwanda, particularly concerning the 1994 genocide.71 By 2006, it had
acquired so much evidence about the genocide, including the guilty plea of a former Rwandan
prime minister,72 that it decided that “the fact that genocide occurred in Rwanda in 1994” is
64 See, e.g., Joseph Rwagatare, ICTR Acquittals Shocking but Expected, THE NEW TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, at
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2013-02-11/62785/. See also Beth S. Lyons, Acquitted but Still Not
Free, INTLAWGRRLS (May 19, 2014), at http://ilg2.org/2014/05/19/acquitted-but-still-not-free/.
65 Address by Judge Vagn Joensen, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the United
Nations Security Council ( Jun. 3, 2015), at http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/address-judge-vagn-joensen-
president-international-criminal-tribunal-rwanda-united-nations.
66 Chine Labbé, Fumbuka Ng’wanakilala & Thomas Escritt, Rwanda Court’s Forgotten Men Pose Challenge to
International Justice, REUTERS, Sept. 28, 2014, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/28/uk-un-justice-
insight-idUKKCN0HN0NI20140928.
67 On the role of NGO advocacy concerning victim compensation, see Emily Haslam, Law, Civil Society and
Contested Justice at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in PATHS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 57 (Marie-Be´ne´dicte Dembour & Tobias Kelly eds., 2007).
68 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Address to the Security Council by Carla Del Ponte, Pros-
ecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Nov. 24, 2000), at http://
www.icty.org/sid/7803; Press Release, ICTR, ICTR President Calls for Compensation for Victims (Oct. 31, 2002),
at http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/ictr-president-calls-compensation-victims. Note, however, that ICTR judges
advocated against changing the ICTR statute to incorporate provisions for victims as in the ICC Statute. See Letter
Dated 14 December 2000 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council (annexing
Letter dated 9 November 2000 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Addressed
to the Secretary-General), UN Doc. S/2000/1198 (Dec. 15, 2000).
69 See Kingsley C. Moghalu, International Humanitarian Law from Nuremberg to Rome: The Weighty Precedents
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 14 PACE INT’L L. REV. 273, 302 (2002).
70 Whether victim participation should in fact be included as a “best practice” in international criminal law
remains to be seen. For an account of some of the challenges in “juridifying” victimhood as a category of legal iden-
tity, see Sara Kendall & Sarah Nouwen, Representational Practices: The Gap Between Juridified and Abstract Victim-
hood, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 235 (2014).
71 Report on the Completion Strategy, supra note 3.
72 He later retracted this. See Convicted Ex-Prime Minister Jean Kambanda Publishes Damning Portrait of Rwanda
Tribunal, HIRONDELLE NEWS (Aug. 7, 2013), at http://www.hirondellenews.com/ictr-rwanda/387-trials-ended/
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a fact of “common knowledge” of which trial chambers must take judicial notice.73 According
to the Tribunal, this “should now silence the ‘rejectionist’ camp which has been disputing the
occurrence of genocide.”74
Where there is contestation about the ICTR’s contribution, it concerns the value of its
record. Historical accounts produced through international criminal trials are notoriously
incomplete. As Richard Wilson has argued, “[b]ecause courts follow law’s own exceptional
principles rather than those of historical inquiry, they can reduce complex histories to a defec-
tive legal template, and thereby distort history.”75 They are products of a juridical framework
that begins from the premise of determining the guilt or innocence of select individuals, not
from the objective of developing a historical account of the events leading to a tribunal’s estab-
lishment. The ICTR’s limited temporal jurisdiction (1994) and its prosecutorial choices also
impose boundaries on the comprehensiveness of the historical record.76
The extent to which the Tribunal’s historical record will be accepted in Rwanda will be
shaped by the political context within which it is received. Scholars have argued that in present-
day Rwanda, the country’s official history is written by the government, with little space for
critical engagement.77 In this environment, RPF supporters are likely to follow the govern-
ment’s evaluation of the ICTR record, which has involved praising convictions and criticizing
acquittals. By contrast, RPF opponents are more likely to dismiss the Tribunal as a political
instrument of the government,78 and may therefore reject the authority of its historical record.
The ownership of the Tribunal’s physical records is also contested.79 While an ICTR archi-
vist has labelled the archives “a global treasure,”80 the Rwandan government and genocide sur-
vivor organizations have argued that the archives should be kept in Rwanda,81 claiming the
archives as “part of Rwanda’s history and legacy.”82 African civil society organizations, in turn,
kambanda-jean/34309-70813-convicted-ex-prime-minister-jean-kambanda-publishes-damning-portrait-of-
rwanda-tribunal.
73 Prosecutor v. E´douard Karemera, et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Appeal on Judgment, para. 35 ( Jun.
16, 2006).
74 Press Release, ICTR, ICTR Appeals Chamber Takes Judicial Notice of Genocide in Rwanda ( Jun. 20, 2006),
at http://www.unmict.unictr.org/en/news/ictr-appeals-chamber-takes-judicial-notice-genocide-rwanda.
75 See RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, WRITING HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 9 (2011).
76 See MOGHALU, supra note 55, at 203–04; KLAUS BACHMANN & ALEKSANDER FATIC, THE UN INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: TRANSITION WITHOUT JUSTICE? 242–43 (2015).
77 POTTIER, supra note 37; Ge´rard Prunier, Rwanda’s Ghosts Refuse to Be Buried, BBC FOCUS, Apr. 8, 2009, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7981964.stm.
78 Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 55, at 79.
79 On the role of archives more generally, see Kirsten Campbell, The Laws of Memory: The ICTY, the Archive, and
Transitional Justice, 22 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 247 (2013).
80 Tom A. Adami, ‘‘Who Will Be Left to Tell the Tale?’’ Recordkeeping and International Criminal Jurisprudence,
7 ARCHIVAL SCI. 213, 217 (2007) (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
81 See Edmund Kagire, Rwanda Presses for ICTR Records, THE EAST AFRICAN, Dec. 20, 2014, at http://www.
theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Rwanda-presses-for-ICTR-records/-/2558/2563806/-/14sscne/-/index.html; Edwin
Musoni, Experts On Why Rwanda Should Take Custody of ICTR Archives, THE NEW TIMES, Feb. 10, 2015,
at http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-02-10/185831/.
82 Rwanda/UN – Kigali Reiterates Its Request to Shelter ICTR’s Archives, HIRONDELLE NEWS, Oct. 21, 2009, at
http://www.hirondellenews.com/ictr-rwanda/410-rwanda-other-countries/23678-en-en-211009-
rwandaun-kigali-reiterates-its-request-to-shelter-ictrs-archives1272912729. See also Permanent Mission of
Rwanda to the United Nations, Statement for the Consideration of the 20th Annual Report of the ICTR and ICTY
by First Counselor, Sana Maboneza (Oct. 12, 2015), available at http://rwandaun.org/site/2015/10/12/statement-
for-the-consideration-of-the-20th-annual-report-of-the-ictr-and-icty-by-first-counselor-sana-maboneza/.
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have lobbied for keeping the archives in Africa as “part of African heritage.”83 Tasked to advise
the Security Council on the location of the ICTR and ICTY archives after their closure, the
UN secretary-general observed that the archives are “tools for fostering reconciliation and
memory”84 and that they should be made accessible to conflict-affected populations.85 Yet he
concluded that neither the former Yugoslavia nor Rwanda appeared to fulfill the criteria for
keeping the archives, particularly those related to security, preservation, and access.86 Even-
tually the Security Council chose the Arusha branch of the Residual Mechanism as the location
for the ICTR archives.87 The future of the archives remains uncertain, especially if the Residual
Mechanism closes down.
Reform of the Domestic Justice System
It has been widely claimed that the ICTR has shaped the Rwandan criminal justice system.
The most cited effects are the abolition of the death penalty, and, for cases transferred from the
ICTR, the nonapplication of the punishment of life imprisonment in solitary confinement,
better witness protection programs, and improved prison conditions.88 The incentive for
change came from the conditionality attached to the ICTR’s transfer of cases to domestic juris-
dictions,89 and to similar conditions in proceedings in other states for extradition or depor-
tation to Rwanda. Both the ICTR and extraditing or deporting states thus spurred the reform
within Rwanda, with the latter at times amplifying the effect of ICTR conditionality by adopt-
ing the same or similar conditions, or by referring to the ICTR’s assessments of the adequacy
of the Rwandan criminal justice system.90
In the absence of an explicit legal basis for transferring cases to domestic justice systems, the
Tribunal developed new procedures,91 which the Security Council implicitly endorsed when
83 Communique´ of the Consultative Meeting on the Legacy, Residual Functions and Archives of the United
Nations’ International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda – UNICTR, Presented to the Advisory Committee on the
Archives for the UN Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia & Rwanda, Arusha, Tanzania, Aug. 16–17, 2008, avail-
able at http://www.africafiles.org/printableversion.asp?id18821.
84 Report of the Secretary-General on the Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Options for Possible
Locations for the Archives of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda and the Seat of the Residual Mechanism(s) for the Tribunals, May 21, 2009, 46, para. 201,
UN Doc. S/2009/258.
85 Id., para. 216.
86 Id.
87 S.C. Res. 1966 (Dec. 22, 2010) (annexing the Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal
Tribunals, Arts. 3, 27, para. 2).
88 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, COMPLEMENTARITY IN ACTION: LES-
SONS LEARNED FROM THE ICTR PROSECUTOR’S REFERRAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CASES TO
NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS FOR TRIAL 2–3 (2015), at http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/
150210_complementarity_in_action.pdf.
89 Other states have also amended domestic law to facilitate referrals; for example, the Dutch Criminal Code was
amended to this end. See Wet van 8 December 2011 tot Wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht, het Wetboek van
Strafvordering, de Wet Internationale Misdrijven, de Wet Overlevering Inzake Oorlogsmisdrijven en de Uitleveringswet
(verruiming mogelijkheden tot opsporing en vervolging van internationale misdrijven), available at https://zoek.
officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2011-605.html, and the Explanatory Note to that legislation available at https://zoek.
officielebekendmakingen.nl/behandelddossier/32475/kst-32475-3?resultIndex19&sorttype1&sortorder4.
90 See, e.g., Brown et al. v. Rwanda, [2009] EWHC 770, Judgment, Appeal Against Extradition.
91 Seventh Annual Report of the ICTR, for the Period from July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002, July 2, 2002, para.
10, UN Doc. S/2002/733; Eighth Annual Report of the ICTR, for the period from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003,
July 11, 2003, para. 6, UN Doc. S/2003/707.
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it encouraged the ICTR “to transfer cases involving intermediate- and lower-rank accused to
competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate, including Rwanda.”92 For suspects not yet
indicted by the ICTR, the prosecutor could refer the files to domestic authorities at her or his
discretion.93 By contrast, referrals of cases of indicted suspects, so-called “Rule 11 bis” cases,
were subject to conditions and judicial supervision.94
In the first decision in a Rule 11 bis case, in 2006 the trial judges cited the Prosecution’s claim
that transfer to Rwanda was not an option at that time because there was no guarantee of fair
trial and the death penalty could be imposed.95 Within a year, Rwanda abolished the death
penalty for offenders transferred by the ICTR or extradited by other countries;96 other offend-
ers could still receive the death penalty. Four months later it abolished the death penalty
entirely.97 But the Trial Chambers still denied the first five cases in which the prosecutor
requested a referral to Rwanda.98
When in 2011 an ICTR Trial Chamber first agreed to the referral of a case to Rwanda, it
noted the legal changes that Rwanda had made: life imprisonment with special conditions was
no longer a potential penalty in transfer cases; immunity was extended to witnesses; and there
were mechanisms in place for witnesses abroad to testify. The Chamber also observed that the
Rwandan Victims and Witnesses Support Unit had been improved, and a Witness Protection
Unit had been created. All seven subsequent requests by the prosecutor to refer cases to Rwanda
were granted.
There are strong indications that Rwanda reformed its legal system in order to receive cases
from the ICTR or to meet states’ conditions for extradition. This claim can especially be made
about changes that apply exclusively to defendants whose cases were transferred by the ICTR
or other states, such as excluding the penalty of life imprisonment in solitary confinement,
extending immunity to witnesses regarding their testimony, and providing detention facilities
that meet international standards. While these changes have been welcomed by many observ-
ers, they have also been criticized for creating a two-tiered legal system, with different penalties,
procedures, and detention conditions depending on whether the case originated domestically
or had been transferred by the ICTR or a state.99 Only a few changes have been made with
respect to the general legal order, most notably the abolition of the death penalty and the review
92 S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 52, at pmbl (8th recital).
93 By June 2010, the ICTR Prosecutor had transferred fifty-five such files to Rwanda. See COMPLEMENTARITY
IN ACTION, supra note 88, at 7, n. 18.
94 For the most recent version, see ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted on Jun. 29, 1996, last
Amended May 13, 2015, rule 11 bis (A) and (B). The rule was first introduced in 2002, and substantially amended
in 2004, 2005, and, to a lesser extent, 2011.
95 Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-R11bis, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Referral
to the Kingdom of Norway, para. 7 (May 19, 2006).
96 Organic Law n° 11/2007 of 16/03/2007 Concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic of Rwanda from the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and from Other States, Arts. 21, 24, Official Gazette, Special Issue,
Mar. 19, 2007.
97 Organic Law n° 31/2007 of 25/07/2007 Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Arts. 2–3, Official
Gazette, Special Issue, July 25, 2007.
98 See the Rule 11 bis decisions by the Trial Chamber in the Munyakazi, Kanyarukiga, Hategekimana, Gatete, and
Kayishema cases, each of which was upheld on appeal (decisions available at http://unictr.unmict.org/en/cases).
99 COMPLEMENTARITY IN ACTION, supra note 88, at 26. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RWANDA: SUS-
PECTS MUST NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO RWANDAN COURTS FOR TRIAL UNTIL IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT
TRIALS WILL COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF JUSTICE 5 (2007), at https://www.amnesty.
org/en/documents/afr47/013/2007/en/.
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of the genocide ideology law.100 With these changes, it is harder to argue that conditionality
imposed by the ICTR, or by extraditing states for that matter, was the only factor driving
change, but it can be identified as an important factor.101
It was not the Tribunal’s creation or existence per se that led to changes in the Rwandan legal
system. There is little sign that any change occurred as a result of “norm infiltration”; namely,
a modeling of norms and practices in the Rwandan justice system on those of the ICTR driven
by the Rwandan government’s conviction that it should do so. Rather, having adopted an abso-
lute anti-impunity policy for those who committed genocide against the Tutsi, the RPF gov-
ernment has sought to receive cases that might otherwise go unprosecuted by the ICTR or
extraditing states, and it was the conditionality attached to the transfer of such cases that incen-
tivized Rwanda to adopt these changes.
Shifting the frame, the ICTR became interested in handing over cases only when it had to
start implementing its completion strategy. It was then that it adopted Rule 11 bis and started
to engage in “capacity building” of the Rwandan justice system. Once the ICTR became inter-
ested in referring cases to Rwanda, and in particular after the first round of applications for
referrals had been denied, it began to encourage states and organizations funding development
programs to invest more in Rwanda’s justice system and to fund ICTR capacity-building ini-
tiatives.102
It appears that the ICTR’s impact on the Rwandan justice system largely stemmed from a
confluence of interests: Rwanda’s interest in prosecuting cases domestically, requiring it to ful-
fill the conditions imposed by the ICTR (and by states); and the ICTR’s interest in having
Rwanda take over several cases so that it could implement its own completion strategy.103
Merely adopting a rule that provides for conditional referrals does not necessarily lead to
domestic reform. At least two additional circumstances are required: a state must be interested
in receiving cases (which is not a given, as the ICC experience of self-referrals suggests); and
the international court concerned must have an incentive to hand over cases.104
100 COMPLEMENTARITY IN ACTION, supra note 88, at 26–27, mentions as other examples: revisions of the
Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure; witness protection services provided by the Witnesses Protection
Unit; and the possibility of trial by a bench of three judges (as opposed to a single judge).
101 With respect to the death penalty, Aime´ Muyoboke Karimunda has shown how there were already strong
abolitionist tendencies within Rwanda, including the RPF’s program, but the ICTR’s involvement helped to expe-
dite the process. Aime´ M. Karimunda, The Death Penalty in Rwanda: Surrounding Politics and the ICTR’s Battle for
Abolition, in THE POLITICS OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION 128, 150 (Madoka Futa-
mura & Nadia Bernaz eds., 2014). See also William A. Schabas, African Perspectives on Abolition of the Death Penalty,
in THE INTERNATIONAL SOURCEBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 30, 47 (William A. Schabas ed., 1997).
102 See COMPLEMENTARITY IN ACTION, supra note 88, at 27–46. On the donor community’s preference for
technocratic justice initiatives in Rwanda’s increasingly oppressive political environment, see Barbara Oomen,
Donor-Driven Justice and Its Discontents: The Case of Rwanda, 36 DEV. & CHANGE 887 (2005).
103 On dependence of the ICTR on Rwanda for implementation of the completion strategy, see also Cecile Aptel,
Closing the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Completion Strategy and Residual Issues, 14 NEW ENG.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 182 (2008); Inge Onsea, The Legacy of the ICTR in Rwanda in the Context of the Com-
pletion Strategy: The Impact of Rule 11 bis, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 173
(Cedric Ryngaert ed., 2009).
104 The ICTR experience raises questions as to whether the ICC will be as concerned with its legacy as the ad hoc
tribunals have been with theirs. The ICTR’s attention to its legacy was prompted by the Security Council increasing
the pressure to finish its cases and close down. Inherent in the idea of a permanent International Criminal Court
is that it has no expiration date. While the ICC will leave a legacy in a particular country when it ends its proceedings
in that situation, that end date will seldom be as final as with the closure of the ad hoc tribunals.
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More difficult than identifying concrete legal reforms is ascertaining whether the ICTR has
promoted the uptake of international norms or policies at the domestic level. For instance, it
is incorrect to suggest that Rwanda’s commitment to prosecuting genocide at the domestic
level was inspired by the ICTR. If anything, the causal chain is the opposite: Rwanda wanted
to prosecute those involved in the genocide, but because it initially did not have the capacity,
or the enforcement jurisdiction in the case of suspects who had fled abroad, it asked the UN
Security Council for an international tribunal.105 Moreover, it cannot be demonstrated that
Rwanda has become a stronger proponent of international criminal law as a result of the ICTR.
At times it has supported international criminal justice beyond cooperating with the ICTR, as
when it transferred Bosco Ntaganda to the ICC.106 Yet it is one of the few African states to have
refused to join the Rome Statute. In the words of the Rwandan Attorney General: “Rwanda
simply doesn’t see any added value in joining the Rome Statute.”107
Peace and Reconciliation?
While “contribut[ing] to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and
maintenance of peace” was one of the two aims explicitly stated in the Security Council res-
olution creating the ICTR, there is little evidence that this will in fact form part of the Tri-
bunal’s legacy in Rwanda. Throughout the ICTR’s lifespan the Security Council has continued
to take decisions concerning the ICTR under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and thus in the
interest of “international peace and security,” and it has commended the ICTR for its impor-
tant work “in contributing to lasting peace and security.”108 The UN secretary-general has
stated that “[t]he remarkable work of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has
shown once again how justice is indispensable for sustainable peace.”109 However, as Nigel
Eltringham has argued, statements like these merely reiterate the promises of the original Secu-
rity Council resolution, rather than realistically assessing what has since occurred.110
Many of the claims concerning the Tribunal’s promotion of peace, reconciliation, and the
rule of law—often mentioned together —fail to explain how the Tribunal contributes to these
aims. Some ICTR officials have suggested what they believe the causal mechanisms to be,111
105 As a nonpermanent member of the Council at the time, Rwanda eventually voted against the resolution estab-
lishing the Tribunal because it had several objections to its institutional design. See The Situation Concerning
Rwanda, UN Doc. S/PV.3453, 14–16 (Nov. 8, 1994) (statement by Mr. Bakuramutsa).
106 See Stephen A. Lamony, Rwanda and the ICC: Playing Politics with Justice, AFRICAN ARGUMENTS, Oct. 21,
2013, at http://africanarguments.org/2013/10/21/rwanda-and-the-icc-playing-politics-with-justice-by-stephen-
a-lamony/.
107 Robert Mugabe, Rwanda Will Not Join Rome Statute—Justice Minister, GREAT LAKES VOICE, Jul. 31, 2014,
at http://greatlakesvoice.com/rwanda-will-not-join-rome-statute-justice-minister/.
108 S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 52, at pmbl (3d recital).
109 Ban Ki-Moon, Remarks at the Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide, Kigali
(Apr. 7, 2014), at http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid7572.
110 Eltringham, supra note 20.
111 Other ICTR officials have rejected the claim that the ICTR has contributed to reconciliation. See PALMER,
supra note 26, at 67–68. See also Bernard A. Muna, Former Deputy Prosecutor ICTR, The Early Challenges of
Conducting Investigations and Prosecutions Before International Criminal Tribunals, Arusha (Nov. 25–27, 2004),
at http://ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/colloquium04/muna.html (former ICTR Deputy Prosecu-
tor suggesting that the Tribunal could have contributed to reconciliation, had it not “failed to meet [the] challenge”
of enhancing its credibility among the Rwandan people). Some defense lawyers suggest that the Tribunal has done
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though usually with little elaboration of how they work in practice.112 One theory is that “[t]he
legacy of the ICTR’s work will benefit reconciliation because accountability leads to a trust in
the rule of law, which assists the return to normalcy for the affected communities and
nations.”113 Other ICTR officials have suggested that the Tribunal has fostered these aims by:
removing key figures in the Rwandan leadership;114 accommodating confessions115 and guilty
pleas;116 individualizing guilt;117 “giving a voice” to victims;118 or through outreach.119 The
name of the ICTR’s outreach center in Kigali appears to illustrate the last theory: “Umusanzu
mu Bwiyunge,” Kinyarwanda for “Contribution to Reconciliation.”
While some of these theories might reveal avenues through which the ICTR has contributed to
peace and reconciliation, some causal mechanisms could also work to undermine reconciliation.
With outreach, for example, it may be that information about the Tribunal’s work fosters greater
openness to reconciliation,120 but it could also have the opposite effect, as when people learn of the
extent and intensity of crimes and the intentions behind them.121 Jean-Marie Kamatali has ques-
tioned whether the individualization of guilt contributes to reconciliation if it is clear that so many
individuals whom the Tribunal leaves unpunished were involved in the commission of crimes for
which others have been tried and punished.122 Kamatali points out that even if it could hold every-
one to account as individuals, the ICTR has, at times, seemingly assigned collective guilt to “the
Hutu,” “Interahamwe,” or the “local population.”123 Whereas the Rwandan government’s official
policy towards promoting reconciliation is to abandon the relevance of the ethnic categories of
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, applying the crime of genocide as defined in international criminal law
required the Tribunal to determine that the Tutsi are in fact an ethnic group in order to establish
that genocide had been committed.124 Claims that the ICTR has contributed to reconciliation
through guilty pleas and by “giving victims a voice” have also been questioned. For example, how
can confessions foster reconciliation if they are given in the victim’s absence? To what extent were
victims able to express themselves other than as witnesses giving evidence, who were also subjected
the opposite, arguing that Hutus in the diaspora see the ICTR as a victor’s court. See Eltringham, supra note 26,
544.
112 But see Timothy Gallimore, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and Its Con-
tributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 239, 251 (2008) (ICTR spokesperson
describing “five major ways” through which the work of the Tribunal may be said to contribute to reconciliation).
113 Adami, supra note 80, at 214. This formulation suggests the ICTR’s legacy will contribute to reconciliation,
rather than the Tribunal’s work as such.
114 See the interviews with ICTR officials in PALMER, supra note 26, at 68, and Nsanzuwera, supra note 34, at
948.
115 PALMER, supra note 26, at 68.
116 Møse, supra note 30, at 938; Gallimore, supra note 112, at 254.
117 Gallimore, supra note 112, at 255.
118 Id. at 239.
119 Erik Møse, The ICTR’s Completion Strategy: Challenges and Possible Solutions, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 667,
678 (2008); Møse, supra note 30, at 938–39.
120 See Alison des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY
ENEMY, supra note 7, at 49, 56 (arguing that the ICTR’s limited outreach may have restricted its contributions to
reconciliation).
121 See Jean-Marie Kamatali, The Challenge of Linking International Criminal Justice and National Reconciliation:
The Case of the ICTR, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 115 (2003).
122 Id. at 118, 124–26.
123 Id. at 122–24; see also Gallimore, supra note 112, at 256.
124 Kamatali, supra note 121, at 121–22.
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to the adversarial practice of cross-examination?125 Others have emphasized the Tribunal’s accep-
tance of impunity for the RPF as a factor that has seriously undermined its ability to contribute to
reconciliation in Rwanda.126 Perhaps because of these difficulties, some scholars have dismissed the
idea that the ICTR has, could have, or should have contributed to reconciliation.127
Whether arguing that the ICTR can or cannot promote peace and reconciliation, these posi-
tions are based on theoretical arguments rather than empirical evidence. There is little empir-
ical evidence of reconciliation in Rwanda in the first place, and those attempting to assess rec-
onciliation have noted that responses were compromised by the respondents’ constraints in
answering sensitive political questions.128 Even less empirical research exists on the impact of
the ICTR itself on peace and reconciliation in Rwanda.129 There is rare and valuable empirical
research into what Rwandans think about reconciliation, including the ICTR’s contribution
to it.130 However, as the authors note, “[t]he stepwise logistic regression . . . finds little rela-
tionship between attitudes toward the various trials and openness to reconciliation.”131 In
other words, these views concerning the ICTR’s contribution to reconciliation do not neces-
sarily illustrate the Tribunal’s actual impact on reconciliation.
The observation that we have little evidence of the ICTR’s contribution to reconciliation
or peace does not imply a criticism of the Tribunal. Whatever the aspirational considerations
of the Security Council, the Tribunal has had to work within the parameters of the statute that
it was given.132 If it had found that peace and reconciliation would be better served by, for
instance, sending peacekeepers, providing reparations to victims or forgetting the past, its stat-
ute did not provide it with the mandate to do anything other than investigating and prosecut-
ing certain international crimes.
In the absence of empirical data on the Tribunal’s actual contribution to peace and recon-
ciliation, international criminal justice pursued in the name of these objectives remains a form
of what Kamatali calls “experimental justice.”133 At a minimum, one would expect a thorough
review of the experiment. But as Harvey Weinstein and Laurel Fletcher have argued, “[d]espite
this lack of data, the purported link between trials and reconciliation has solidified into articles
of faith that guide policy decisions in the international arena.”134 Indeed, one legacy of the
ICTR and the ICTY is that empirical evidence on their contribution to peace and reconcil-
iation has arguably become less relevant, for they have successfully transformed “no peace with-
out (criminal) justice” and “no reconciliation without (criminal) justice” from causal ideas into
principled ideas. The former are ideas concerning cause and effect that require evidence; the
125 Id. at 131–32.
126 MOGHALU, supra note 55, at 207; Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 55, at 75–78.
127 Sadat, supra note 47, 128.
128 See Ian S. McIntosh, A Creative Approach to Measuring Reconciliation in Rwanda, 1 CONFLICT TRENDS 33
(2013).
129 Kamatali, supra note 121, at 116.
130 Longman, Connecting Justice to Human Experience: Attitudes Toward Accountability and Reconciliation in
Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra note 7, at 206.
131 Id. at 219.
132 See also MOGHALU, supra note 55, at 202; Gallimore, supra note 112, at 241.
133 Kamatali, supra note 121, at 133.
134 Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice
to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 600 (2002).
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latter are ideas concerning notions of right and wrong, for which evidence is far less relevant.135
In other words, the claims that the ICTR has contributed to peace and reconciliation may have
left the legacy of an ide´e fixe: namely, that after situations of mass atrocity, criminal justice must
be done in order to achieve these aims.
V. CONCLUSION: FROM LEGACY TALK TOWARD AN ETHOS OF MODESTY
The ambiguities around the ICTR’s potential legacy contrast sharply with the certainty
of assertions about what it will have been, including in made claims by the Tribunal itself.
Many of the claims are dominated by enumerations, such as the number of cases and the
number of visitors to ICTR information centers. Seemingly speaking for themselves, the
numbers suggest a concreteness that conceals the uncertainty of the Tribunal’s legacy. The
quantification of legacy claims reflects what seems to be a more general preference for
ascribing numerical values to categories whose meanings are not self-evident. Concepts
such as peace and reconciliation that are harder to represent numerically are less prominent
in these documents; they appear instead as principled ideas that do not require empirical
backing.
The desire for certainty may also explain the shift away from the focus of the resolution that
created the Tribunal, which emphasized contributing to Rwanda, toward globalizing interna-
tional criminal law as a field that can be applied “to all people, everywhere.” Establishing the
contribution to international criminal law is easier than assessing the Tribunal’s impact upon
Rwanda.136 But the explanation for this shift in focus is not only epistemological; it is also polit-
ical. As the Tribunal’s life story is being reworked, only success stories are emphasized. When
the ICTR’s legacy video concludes that the Tribunal has been “an important step in a global
movement towards accountability, everywhere,”137 it recounts its life story not as a limited
institutional response to a horrific moment in history, but rather as part of a broader narrative
in which the Tribunal has secured a place in the legal lineage of a global movement against
impunity, a movement that is likely to exist long after the Tribunal will have departed. This
reworking of the life story is not only, in Bauman’s words, a “bid for immortality” by giving
an account of accomplishments that endure beyond the span of material lives; it is also an
attempt to identify with a legal and presumably apolitical global movement. By contrast, any
impact in the domain of peace and reconciliation in Rwanda involves an association with a gov-
ernment whose legitimacy is increasingly questioned. The ICTR’s legacy may perhaps influ-
ence Rwandan politics; far more certain, however, is that Rwandan politics influences the shape
and interpretation of the ICTR’s legacy in Rwanda.
The shift in emphasis from contributing to Rwanda toward the international legal order has
been accompanied by a shift in focus on audience. Rather than directed to Rwandans, the Tri-
bunal’s legacy claims appear to be primarily oriented toward international criminal law’s sites
135 RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NETWORKS AND
NORMS 14 (Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2002).
136 See also PALMER, supra note 26, at 62.
137 See ICTR Legacy Video, supra note 2.
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of production in The Hague and elsewhere, and even more broadly toward global policymak-
ers, who establish and fund international criminal tribunals and who may be persuaded that
such tribunals will leave a meaningful legacy in postconflict societies.138
Legacy talk also performs a role of memorialization. The legacy website, the directory of ex-
ICTR staff, and the legacy documents operate as artifacts of what the institution performed
over a twenty-year period.139 Indeed, the Tribunal’s President has suggested that even the
records are as much about the Tribunal as about the genocide when he recounted to the UN
General Assembly in October 2015: “[w]hile the ICTR may shortly close, the records gener-
ated over the past two decades provide not only an account of the Genocide, but also tell the
story of the Tribunal.”140 The Tribunal’s records recount both the Rwandan genocide and an
institutional story of the ICTR itself, telling a particular narrative of the past that overstates the
ICTR’s postconflict role while marginalizing alternate narratives. In this way, the Tribunal
participates in a practice akin to what Jens Meierhenrich has described as the Rwandan gov-
ernment’s “centralization of memory,” where official memorials have served to legitimate the
state and its particular presentation of history.141 The memorialization practices undertaken
through the ICTR’s legacy website form part of the Tribunal’s own legitimation strategy: as
a way of justifying its cost, the long duration of its trials, and its extended lifespan.
Legacy talk also gives a sense of meaning to those involved in the enterprise. Some people
who worked for the ICTR have dedicated years of their lives to the institution—years filled
with distressing evidence on the one hand and monotonous procedures on the other, which
often came, so professionals say, at personal cost.142 Now that the institution is closing its
doors, they may ponder its larger meaning, summarized by one of Eltringham’s Tribunal infor-
mants in the form of a question: “When we walk out, what was it all about?”143 It is not just
that they are part of the Tribunal’s life story; the Tribunal also forms part of their potential
legacy.
Discussing a tribunal’s legacy may inspire more reflection upon its work in practice, but less
focus on legacy talk—the bid for immortality—may be a productive development. There are
many reasons for an ethos of modesty when evaluating the legacy of an international criminal
tribunal. Apart from issues of temporality and epistemology discussed above, which pose chal-
lenges to ascertaining what a legacy will be, there is the risk that the practice of legacy talk degen-
erates into decontextualized assertions about institutional performance and value. It is perhaps
tempting to celebrate an impressive list of jurisprudential innovations, the number of cases
138 In this sense the Tribunal’s mode of address that privileges outsiders over the Rwandan people appears to
adopt an orientation that parallels other responses to the genocide, such as prominent public apologies from political
leaders. See Nesam McMillan, Regret, Remorse and the Work of Remembrance: Official Responses to the Rwandan Geno-
cide, 19 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 85 (2010).
139 Jens Meierhenrich, Topographies of Remembering and Forgetting: The Transformation of Lieux de Me´moire in
Rwanda, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 38, at 283.
140 Address to the 70th United Nations General Assembly: Twentieth Annual Report of the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for Rwanda by Judge Vagn Joensen, President, Oct. 13, 2015, available at http://unictr.unmict.org/
en/news/address-70th-united-nations-general-assembly-twentieth-annual-report-international-criminal.
141 Meierhenrich, supra note 139.
142 Nigel Eltringham, “A War Crimes Community?”: The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Beyond Jurisprudence, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 309, 312 (2008).
143 See Eltringham, supra note 26. For a similar article concerning the legacy of the ICTY, see Fre´de´ric Me´gret,
The Legacy of the ICTY as Seen through Some of Its Actors and Observers, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 1011, 1013
(2012).
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tried, and the individuals who have contributed to the Tribunal’s work. Yet there is a risk that
by focusing on the institution and its accomplishments, events that should never become nor-
malized—the “unimaginable atrocities” that provide the raison d’eˆtre of international criminal
tribunals144—become occasions for institutional self-aggrandizement. Legacy talk’s focus on
the institution and its contributions to international criminal law risks pushing the phenom-
enon of the genocide into the background.
Trials by international criminal tribunals alone cannot do justice to the enormity of mass
atrocity or to the populations affected by it. Doing justice in that sense goes beyond an inter-
national tribunal’s mandate. But the bare minimum of doing justice to genocide requires
acknowledging the limits of the retributive legal form and an ethos of institutional modesty.
144 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, pmbl, 2d recital.
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